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defenses cannot be dismissed as self-serving if corroborated by other facts, will
make every effort to supply substantiating evidence even if it might be inadmissible in court; for the agents will not reject the taxpayer's contentions unless
the report shows that they are completely groundless or have been discredited
by factual investigation.
This book is written in large measure as a practical handbook, and its worth
is illustrated by the fact that in a recent trial in which the reviewer participated,
counsel for both sides quoted from it in the courtroom in connection with legal
arguments. The chapter on Trial of a Criminal Tax Case would serve as a
typical pre-trial memorandum. Some of the problems and approaches are outlined in the form of questions and answers of witnesses.
But the effort to achieve practical usefulness has not been at the expense of
adequate concern for conceptual considerations, and the frequent use of examples gives fuller meaning to the discussion of the many difficult legal questions which arise in tax fraud cases.
The use of indirect methods of proving evasion, such as net worth increases,
expenditures, and bank deposits, is the subject of a separate chapter. While
other evidentiary problems encountered in tax cases, as well as constitutional
rights based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, are not exhaustively discussed, they are at least sufficiently presented to indicate the basic principles
which apply.
The textual discussion is followed by a detailed appendix which summarizes
the various criminal and civil penalties which might be applied in fraud cases,
and by a topical index. Unfortunately, there is no table of cases. This is one
serious handicap in using the book in the courtroom, where time may not permit
the use of the index or table of contents in locating the discussion of a particular
case which opposing counsel has just cited. Since the volume is equipped for a
pocket supplement, it is hoped that a table of cases for the bound volume, as
well as for the supplement, can be subsequently provided.
Mr. Mortenson has combined practical knowledge and the judgment born
of experience with good scholarship in a book which is a good working tool as
well as a source for research in greater depth.
SPtRGEON AVAKiAN*
* Member

of the California Bar.

Some Potentialities of Experimental Jurisprudence as a New Branch of Social
Science. By Frederick K. Beutel. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska
Press, 1958. Pp. xvi, 440. $6.00.
Professor Beutel's book is one of the most recent additions to a long list of
calls to arms that have appeared over the last fifty years in the fight to persuade
people to make laws scientific. The general theme of this book is not a new one
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-briefly, the theme is that since law is a means of social control and is thus
concerned with means-end problems and, since the most efficient solutions to
means-end problems are those derived from the use of the scientific method,
therefore, to formulate the most efficient laws, we must base them on scientific
knowledge. This involves the evaluation of existing laws and the formulation
of new laws on the basis of appropriate scientific knowledge that is already
available and the gathering of such scientific knowledge where it does not
already exist. This is "[a] science of law based on a rigorous application of the
scientific method [which] should be devoted to the study of the phenomena of
law-making, the effect of law upon society and the efficiency of laws in accomplishing the purposes for which they came into existence" (p. 18), and which
Professor Beutel calls "Experimental Jurisprudence."
The book is divided into two parts. Part I is primarily concerned with an
explanation of the procedures of experimental jurisprudence, a discussion of
some of the obstacles to its use by law-making bodies and the presentation of
some examples of government regulations based on the methods of experimental
jurisprudence. Part Hf is devoted to the presentation of five pilot research studies
undertaken by Professor Beutel, as examples of the application of experimental
jurisprudence techniques to problems of law. The first four of these pilot studies
deal with laws in Nebraska governing the sterilization of barbers' instruments,
the use of tobacco by minors, the standard size of bricks and the plumbing code,
while the fifth study is considerably more detailed and comprehensive and deals
with the bad check laws in Nebraska. Each of these studies includes an investigation of the extent to which the law in question is enforced, an examination
of the underlying assumptions involved in the law in the light of scientific evidence, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the law as a means of achieving the
ends which it is assumed the law is designed to accomplish and some suggestions
for amending the law. Since Professor Beutel takes great pains to point out with
respect to the five studies that "there is no pretext that this is a perfected bit of
research ...the methods of social research adopted are therefore subject to
much refinement... the results are in a sense only a larger pilot study...
the whole is set out here as a modest illustration of the possibilities of the application of Experimental Jurisprudence to the practical problems of law enforcement," it is hardly fitting for this reviewer to criticize the studies in terms of
their lack of scientific rigour although, as the author himself apparently realizes,
questions of this kind could be raised.
As we have pointed out, Part I includes an explanation of the procedures
involved in experimental jurisprudence and these are conveniently listed as
eight steps, as follows:
1. The nature of the phenomena which law attempts to regulate should be studied.
In particular the social problem to which a specific law is directed should be carefully
isolated and examined.
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2. The rule of law or other method used to regulate the phenomena or intended to
solve the social problem should be accurately stated.
3. The effect on society of adopting the rule should be observed and measured.
4. There should then be constructed a hypothesis that attempts to explain the reasons for this reaction.
5. This description, then broadened to apply to other analogous situations, might
be considered a jural law that describes or predicts results which would occur on application of a similar regulatory law to similar problems.
6. If analysis shows that the law is inefficient, there could then be suggested new
methods of accomplishing the originally desired result.
7. The proposed new law could be enacted and the process repeated.
8. A series of such adoptions of new laws and the study of their results might throw
important light upon the usefulness of the underlying purposes behind the enactment,
thus effecting a possible alteration in or abandonment of this objective, or in the long
run, though this now appears doubtful, even induce a revision of our present scale of
social and political ethics [p. 18].
It is understood, of course, that the various studies and investigations referred
to in several of the above steps should be scientific. To this reviewer at least,
a program set forth in such general terms as those outlined above is perfectly
acceptable. In fact, to reject the goal of rationality in ordering social relations
is, today, tantamount to being against virtue and for sin. But, while most are
in favour of virtue in general and yet violently disagree as to what is the virtue
in a specific instance, so one can agree with Professor Beutel's general position
that the application of scientific method to problems of law is a laudable objective but, at the same time, most emphatically disagree with him when he explains in detail what he means by scientific method and the way in which it
should be applied to problems of law.
Besides explaining the procedures of experimental jurisprudence, this first
part of the book discusses what the author conceives to be the major obstacles
to the wholesale application of the techniques of experimental jurisprudence to
problems of law by law-making bodies. Briefly, these are:
1. The mistaken view that the formulation of laws are policy decisions
which involve disputes over "values" which it is not possible to resolve by the
use of scientific knowledge alone. Thus, for these people, experimental jurisprudence cannot, by itself, formulate laws; an additional component is necessary called a "value judgment" which is different from a scientific judgment.
At best, therefore, scientific information can only help us reach a policy decision and it cannot make it for us.
2. The second obstacle to the implimentation of the experimental jurisprudence program is our system of government and law. Says Beutel:
The democratic process which is supposed to control our present form of government
whatever its good features may be, is not adapted to social change involving the
adoption and use of scientific ideas. The principal reasons why democracy acts as a
barrier to the application of scientific techniques to law-making are:
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a)that both legislative and judicial policy decisions are influenced by public sentiment which is irrational because the public cannot possibly understand the complicated scientific knowledge which must be used to make rational decisions.
b)that both legislative and judicial law-makers, while perhaps somewhat better able
to understand scientific material than the general public, are subject to influence
by selfish pressure groups and, in any case, they do not have the equipment or
facilities to secure the necessary and appropriate scientific information which would
enable them to make rational policy decisions [p. 73].
What are Professor Beutel's suggestions for overcoming these two obstacles?
With respect to the first, it sometimes appears as if he is advancing the argument that, in reality, it does not exist, i.e., that in fact the policy decisions
necessary in formulating laws do not involve "value judgments" because there
is no such thing as a value judgment, and that therefore science alone can solve
problems of law. At other times, it seems as if, while denying the necessity of
making value judgments in formulating law, Beutel actually brings it into his
analysis, by the back-door as it were, by calling "values" by a different name,
e.g., "choices" or "demands." He suggests that experimental jurisprudence
would measure these "choices" in the community, regard them as legitimate
ends and restrict its own investigations'to the determination of the most efficient
means of achieving these ends chosen by the community. In support of the first
position, Beutel examines various concepts of "value" "including "inherent
value," "subjective value," "objective value," "moral value," "instrumental
value" and "valuation or evaluation process," for the purpose of ascertaining
whether they have any useful meaning. He concludes:
[it appears then that the term 'value' serves no purpose in Experimental Jurisprudence.... [A] descriptive and experimental social science can do without the term
'value'. All that is necessary is to discover the actual condition of the interests of demands of people in society to expose the need for granting the demands which they
make, and to choose the legal devices which will be useful for making possible the fulfilment of the desires represented by the choices, with the least social friction [p. 44].
Thus, "subjective value" becomes an individual's objective choice between two
or more alternatives; "objective value" becomes the aggregate of the individual's choices in a social group; "moral value" becomes the basis on which these
choices are made; and "instrumental value" becomes the choice through which
another end or goal is achieved. Now, this procedure may make the term
"value" more operational than a definition of the term which refers to subjective feeling inferred from overt behavior, and it may be, as Beutel suggests, that
it is better to avoid the confusion associated with the term "value" and to use
the word "choice," but this procedure does not, as Beutel also implies, solve the
problem of "value judgments" or "choices" in relation to policy decisions, i.e.,
whether such choices can be made solely with reference to the relevant scientific
information.
Following his discussion and rejection of the utility of the concept of "value,"
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Beutel presents a three-fold division of "wants" with which the experimental
jurist should work in formulating scientific laws, as follows: "demands," ("wants
which are expressed in such a manner that they may be objectively stated");
"desires," ("human interests in things which may or may not be expressed but
which the individual or group subjectively wants, craves or would if encouraged claim"); and, "needs," ("those conditions or things in the current state of
society which, if present and effective, would cause the individual or society to
function with the least friction and more in accordance with the natural order
of his or its universe at that moment"). It will be seen that both "demands"
and "desires" are in fact similar to the "values" (or "objective choices of individuals and groups" if Beutel prefers) which he previously discussed. "Needs,"
however, are different. "Needs," in Beutel's terms, include most importantly
those laws which the experimental jurist determines are the most efficient
means of achieving the ends ("demands") of the community-they are the
"instrumental values or choices," but not necessarily those that people want
or demand because they may want or demand measures that are not effective
in securing the ends they desire and therefore they are not "needs" in Beutel's
sense. So it would appear that, after rejecting the usefulness of the concept of
"value" and suggesting that experimental jurisprudence need never concern
itself with such things, Beutel brings them back again as an essential element
to be considered by the experimental jurist, but with new names. We might
add in passing that further evidence of confused thought on the subject of
value appears in the following sentence: "The argument on an ethical basis...
entirely disappears when the process is regularized and made legal" (p. 412).
Beutel recognizes that in present-day society different groups in the community have different and frequently conflicting "demands" and that the
experimental jurist will have to make choices or judgments as to which should
be supported by law. Can these judgments be made solely on the basis of the
relevant scientific information? Here again Beutel appears to give two contradictory answers. He says:
Experimental Jurisprudence offers the means of discovering and measuring demands,
desires and needs, provides a means for determining which ones should be satisfied,
and can create a technique for choosing the devices best calculated to make the needed
change [p. 46].
He then elaborates on the procedure:
In making these decisions, both the lawmaker and the jurist must take disclosed desires, demands and needs as they find them and work with them toward a proper reconciliation of all. Preconceived ideals of usefulness, ends, purposes and the like, necessarily have some effect on the lawmaker, but the jurist need only look at results.
For the present it seems that in weighing or measuring wants, each demand or
desire should have a one-to-one ratio with every other desire and-demand. Thus the
unit for consideration would seem to be the single want of each person and not the
person himself. Intensity of desires and demands and the numbers of people having
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them, of course, must also be considered. For the present, the numerical or statistical
basis seems useful. When needs are discovered, they should, of course, be given preference ahead of both demands and desires, but these latter two cannot be entirely ignored
because there is probably a human need for satisfying demands and desires even though
the things demanded are not needed and may not even be useful to the persons making
the demands [pp. 53-54].
This suggests then, that the policy decision should be determined by a count
of noses with respect to objectives or ends, and then the experimental jurist
will formulate a law which will most efficiently achieve the end desired by the
majority after an appropriate scientific investigation. However, an additional
criterion for choice is provided:
[H]e must choose the law or course of action which he believes will be the most useful
to accomplish the purpose of keeping the peace or satisfying the interests.... All that
is necessary is... to choose the legal devices which will be useful for making possible
the fulfillment of the desires represented by the choices, with the least social friction
[pp. 43-44].
It would appear that Beutel thinks experimental jurisprudence escapes the
value problem involved when making policy decisions by choosing the end desired by the majority and, by scientific investigation, selecting the most efficient
means for achieving this end-bearing in mind the need to maintain internal
peace in the society. But, of course, this is not a means of escaping the value
choice, it is a way of making it! In other words, Beutel is recommending that
the "ultimate values" are the wishes of the majority, internal peace, and lack
of friction, and that these be used as the "absolute values" in terms of which
the choice of "instrumental values" (or "needs" in Beutel's sense) are made;
one need hardly add that this solution is no more "scientific" than many other
"ultimate values" put forward in opposition to this one.
It should be pointed out, however, that although the above stand receives the
greatest support in the book under review, the author does sometimes claim a
more limited role for experimental jurisprudence. At times, for example, the
jurist is seen as only suggesting to statesmen and other policy-makers changes in
the law which might better effectuate the policy for which it was created.
Again, a more modest claim is made for the role of experimental jurisprudence
when the author states:
Nobody should be prepared to argue that the solution of all moral, social and international problems are presently possible by the technique of Experimental Jurisprudence, but can it not be said that it is foreseeable that the ultimate projection of procedures here suggested may lead to a possible means of resolution of clashes of opinion
which in the past have been settled only by brute force? [P. 36.]
And finally Beutel states:
In short, Experimental Jurisprudence, when properly applied, can now be expected
only to test the efficiency of a law in attaining the particular ends for which it was
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adopted and in turn can state the results which will follow various attempts to reach
such ends. The data thus accumulated may throw great light on the ultimate usefulness
of the objectives and the effectiveness of the means used to attain them [p. 551.
Up to this point, it will be seen that Beutel's position with respect to the role
of experimental jurisprudence in the area of policy-making is not clear; he seems
to reject the notion that policy decisions involve values and therefore to claim
that experimental jurisprudence can formulate laws on the basis of scientific
evidence alone, while at other times he takes a much more modest view and
recognizes that choices between conflicting demands have to be made and
admits therefore that experimental jurisprudence can only propose laws on
an "if-then" basis; in other words, the experimental jurist requires some
guidance as to ends, and his role is therefore limited to supplying information
based on scientific study in the following form: "If" the law-makers want end
x, "then" this law is the most efficient means of achieving it. Or, "if" the lawmakers do x, "then" there will be certain consequences. However, to this reviewer, even this position assumes an over-simplified situation and raises serious
problems which are not discussed in Beutel's book. For example, Beutel assumes
that the majority of legislative and judicial disputes are of the simple kind
where there is unanimity as to ends but alternative means are available. In fact,
in the majority of legislative disputes, there is no such unanimity in any meaningful sense, and alternative means may be equally competent to achieve the
particular end, but may have vastly different consequences in other areas.
Professor Beutel continually cites scientific traffic control as an example of
the use of experimental jurisprudence techniques in law-making, so let us illustrate this point by reference to an hypothetical issue in this area. Suppose there is an intersection where two people on the average have been killed
each year over the past twenty-five years and suppose that by scientific investigation we can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the installation
of a stop sign will reduce the deaths to only one a year. Even if there were
complete unanimity among legislators and members of the community that
the end of saving life was a "value" or "demand," would we as scientists
be justified in recommending that a stop sign be placed there? And would
this recommendation be scientific? Obviously not, for even such a simple
situation may involve extremely difficult choices which cannot be made, at
least at the present time, on scientific grounds alone. For example, the installation of a stop sign involves an economic cost in terms of materials for
the sign, installation and maintenance, and the resources which would be used
for this purpose could be used for other purposes. Perhaps the same amount of
money used for say the provision of free drugs could save two lives, or perhaps
it could be used to considerably improve the lives of those who are not killed
at the intersection. This is, perhaps, a rather strained example, but it was
chosen purposely in order to show that, even in what appears to be an extremely
simple situation, there may still be difficult decisions to make. That we fre-
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quently make such decisions without any qualms is true, but that we make
them "scientifically" is not. (It might be pointed out parenthetically, however,
that a similar dispute concerning the allocation of resources is in fact raised by
many people who, while accepting both the value of certain social ends and the
effectiveness of government regulation in achieving these ends, nevertheless
decide that "bureaucracy" is too high a price to pay for the desired end and
therefore demand that the community's resources be spent in other ways.)
A similar case where Beutel does not even appear to recognize the complexity
of issues involved in a given legislative problem occurs in connection with the
pilot study into the problem of the use of tobacco by minors. After presenting
the results of the study, he states: ".... but a number of burning scientific questions will remain," and then he lists them as follows:
1. Is smoking injurious to adults?
2. Is it more injurious to young people?
3. Is it progressively more injurious as the smoker's years decline?
4. At what age, if any, is smoking by minors so injurious that it should be prohibited
because it endangers health or bodily or mental functions? [P. 207.1
The answers to these questions may be relatively easy to determine scientifically, but he neglects to include in his list other questions which are not quite so
easy to answer scientifically. For example, if it is demonstrated that smoking
is injurious to the minor's health, should we pass a law prohibiting it or should
we leave this to parents to control? Does smoking by minors have negative consequences for society (as distinct from those for the individual smoker) and, if
not, should there be regulation in such an area? If there are negative social consequences, is the social cost of the enforcement of the law justified by a greater
saving by the elimination of the negative consequences? Does social control by
law in such areas as this diminish the individual's power to make his own
choices in other areas? And, if so, what are the consequences of this? And one
could go on for a long time raising similar questions pertinent to the issue which
are somewhat more difficult to answer than those mentioned by Beutel.
If this is true in relatively simple choice situations, then it will be seen that
in disputes concerning such issues as private enterprise or public ownership,
sales tax or income tax, strict or lenient divorce law, the scientific choice between
competing proposals is an extremely difficult, if not an impossible, one to make.
This is not to say that scientific information concerning the consequences of
alternative means would not be of tremendous help in reaching decisions in
these matters-with this we are in entire agreement-but this position is far
short of that which Beutel appears to take throughout the major portion of
Part I of his book.
In fact, one's worst apprehensions concerning Beutel's position with respect
to the role of experimental jurisprudence are confirmed in the later chapters of
Part I. As pointed out earlier, the second major obstacle to the implementation
of the experimental jurists' program is the democratic form of government.
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For reasons which are not clear to this reviewer, Professor Beutel discusses
such concepts as "the state," "sovereignty" and "the law-maker or law-giver"
in a chapter entitled: The Purposes of Law and Government: Relationship of
Experimental Jurisprudence to Government, Lawmaking and Policy Decisions.
Each concept, he concludes, is a "fiction." Specifically, he says that the state
"is a fiction about which much real loyalty has been built," although he had
pointed out previously:
[T]he term "state," in its modern sense, is a creation of the writers on philosophy and
political science, sometimes used, as is the case in the United States, to designate a
geographical portion of a larger federal government, again as a synonym for the ultimate power or sovereignty of a particular government.... [I]t is used, perhaps, as a
collective noun to represent the powers and interests of the body politic as a unit distinguished from the powers and interests of the individual subjects of the government
[p. 59].
Sovereignty is a "fiction" although the author also admits that "[i]t is sometimes
used to describe the power of a person or group to change the rule or laws without any restraint or interference by others and without suffering any sanction
for so doing" (p. 60). The lawmaker is a "combination of fact and fiction which
usually designates that part of the governmental organization which enacts and
creates laws" (p. 60). Beutel then goes on to identify specific lawmakers and
to suggest that "the law-giving or law-making function has been delegated to
so many agencies that the term as a unit has become a mere fiction" (pp. 60-61).
(Emphasis added.) It seems odd to distinguish between "fictions" and "nonfictions" on the basis of whether the term is in the singular or plural. In fact, the
use of the terms "fiction" and "fictional" throughout this chapter is very puzzling, especially when the author admits that these "fictions" have demonstrable
consequences about which he has much to say.
However, it is fairly clear in the remainder of Part I of the book that Professor Beutel feels quite strongly that our judicial and legislative system hampers
the onward march of scientific social control and he urges that it be replaced by
a system which may be characterized as: "A Government of the People, By
the Scientists, For what the People should want." Before proceeding further,
let me say that, on this issue, as on the one discussed previously, Beutel's position is not consistently stated. For example, he speaks approvingly of advancing
the program of experimental jurisprudence by jurists who, operating independently of the government, offer advice and suggestions for legal reform
(p. 64). He points out that traffic engineers are "advising changes and improvements in the laws and regulations based upon scientifically gleaned data" (p.
129). Finally, mention is made of the necessity of separating research from the
administration of the law because research would tend to be influenced by the
prejudices of the administration. However, since experimental jurists are assumed to be "impartial," it is conceivable that this requirement of separation
would not apply to them. From these statements, it might be inferred that the
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author would be content for experimental jurists to play the limited role of
scientific advisor to legislative bodies which would have the final responsibility
for making the policy decisions. On the other hand, it seems to this writer that,
on balance, Beutel espouses most forcibly the Comtian view that at the top
of the societal pyramid should stand the social scientist (or presumably in
Beutel's case, the experimental jurist) who will decide what is good law for
society on the basis of scientific investigation. In support of this interpretation
of Beutel's position, it should be mentioned that he spends some thirty-four
pages in Chapter V criticizing many aspects of both the legislative and judicial
systems as hinderances to the scientific determination of policy disputes. When
discussing the types of relationships that could exist between experimental
jurists and the government, Professor Beutel appears to prefer a relationship of
identity-the experimental jurists are not only to provide scientific information
but also to make the laws. Finally, in Chapter VI, when describing the "Complete Development of Experimental jurisprudence," i.e., traffic control, where
experimental jurists make law based upon scientific investigation, the author
uses the most glowing language of which the following is typical:
It is rapidly being recognized that, after a study of the facts and the body of available scientific knowledge, the expert traffic engineer or director is far better qualified
than any elective body to institute laws to regulate drivers and pedestrians. Popular
referenda on the advisability of diagonal parking in specific locations, such as was
recently held in the city of Lincoln, Nebraska, are silly procedures which will soon
become as obsolete as the carrier pigeon [p. 134] [footnotes omitted].
It is felt that many readers of Professor Beutel's book will be considerably
disturbed by such suggestions, especially in view of what has already been
pointed out with respect to the complexity of the issues involved in most policy
decisions. Further, in view of the disagreement among eminently reasonable
and intelligent men, including some scientists, concerning the consequences
and therefore advisability of granting legislative power to a small group of socalled "experts," it is astounding that Professor Beutel does not deal with these
questions at length in his book. In fact, so far as this writer can ascertain, the
only mention made of the problem by the author is tucked away in a footnote
where he dismisses the matter as follows:
Here again the facts of the studies show results that are contrary to popular beliefs.
Again and again the idea is repeated that bureaucracy is a dangerous thing and that
public officials should be limited in their power and discretion by laws which make
them subject to judicial review and to legislative checks. While this may be a justifiable fear of despotism remaining as a sort of aftermath of misrule by certain incompetent, corrupt or hereditary autocrats, there is every indication that successful operation of government in a complicated modern society will require that public officials
have great latitude to change the rules in the spheres in which they operate so that by
proper experimentation they may reach the optimum results in carrying out the purposes for which their offices were created. The ultimate limits upon such discretion
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may not flow from any theory of checks and balances but rather from the restraints
inherent in the scientific method itself [p. 396, n. 57].
The concern with these particular suggestions increases when one considers
the state of knowledge in the social sciences at the present time and in the
foreseeable future upon which so much of the author's program in the field of
law depends.
This observation brings us to the last point which we are able to consider in
this review, that after reading this book a distinct impression is left that the
author is far more optimistic than many others concerning the present state of
scientific knowledge and of reliable techniques for obtaining such knowledge.
For example, in many places throughout the book there are claims that scientific evidence such as blood-tests, lie-detectors, tests for intoxication, truth
serums and, of course, "experts," justify the abolition of the jury system. Likewise, the author asserts that scientific evidence justifies sterilization and artificial insemination, and revisions in the sex, marriage and divorce laws. It is not
suggested that these contentions are all incorrect, and, of course, considering the
vagueness which characterizes the statements, it is difficult to know precisely
what is being claimed. It is, however, safe to say that with respect to most of the
above issues, one would find considerable disagreement even among the "experts" as to what changes in the present laws are justified by the available scientific knowledge. Beutel's optimism in these matters may be the result of more
narrowly defining the choice situation than others do, or it may be due to his
having somewhat different standards of scientific rigour than others, which
would permit him to draw conclusions from research data which others would
not consider warranted.
Although the bulk of the above comments on Professor Beutel's book have
been of a critical nature, it should perhaps be emphasized that this reviewer has
purposely selected what he considers the more extreme positions taken by the
author. While the author does frequently tend to overstate his case, perhaps
this is a fate that usually befalls those who are primarily concerned with convincing others of the virtues of a program to which they are themselves committed.
And, in any case, there is much in Beutel's book that is stimulating and suggestive of potentially fruitful research in the area of law and the social sciences.
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